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John Henry Newman’s reflections on first principles aim to account for the insurmountable dif-
ferences between people’s worldviews.1 The emphasis Newman puts on first principles cannot
be overstated. Newman argues for the ultimately determinative role that they play in any dis-
pute. There can be little doubt that Newman was familiar with Aristotle’s statement from the
Nicomachean Ethics that ‘It is thought. . .that the starting-point or principle is more than half the
whole matter.’2 In Newman’s words, these ‘first elements of thought’ are ‘half the battle’.3
Since first principles are so central to the thought of Newman, much has been written on this
topic, not only to elucidate Newman’s thoughts on the matter, but also to make sense of the
term’s development in Newman’s corpus.4 This article will summarize some of the main points
of the latest contributors with special attention to the work of Rik Achten.5 While his work has
much to commend for itself, I will criticize one aspect of it while offering a close reading of rel-
evant passages from Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics in order to shed light on the noetic aspect
of the Illative Sense in its acquisition of first principles.
I. THE AMBIGUITY OF NEWMANIAN FIRST PRINCIPLES
In 1851, Newman dedicated an entire chapter to the topic of first principles in his polemical
work, The Present Position of Catholics in England, and nearly twenty years later treated the
subject once again in his Grammar of Assent (1870). Despite the passage of time, Newman’s
treatment of first principles in the Grammar had not become any more systematic or clear.
Hence, grappling with Newman’s understanding of first principles has proven difficult.6 In the
more mature Grammar – which we consider here – Newman offers extended reflections on first
principles in Chapters 4 on Notional Assent and 9 on the Illative Sense.
In the section on ‘Presumption’ in Chapter 4, Newman defines a first principle as ‘the propo-
sition with which we start in reasoning on any given subject-matter’.7 Here a first principle is
considered to be a Notional Assent to a general proposition. This general proposition (e.g.,
There is an external world; There is One Supreme Master; There is a right and a wrong) is an
abstraction or a conclusion that issues from an induction from particular experiences of phenom-
ena. In sum, first principles, at least according to Grammar, Chapter 4, are ‘abstractions from
particular experiences’. 8
In Chapter 9, by contrast, first principles are deployed in very specific discourses, and seem
to go far beyond any natural intuition. Here, Newman is discussing the way in which the Illative
Sense functions at the beginning of any concrete inquiry. First principles, for example, come
into conflict within disputes over the ‘end and scope of civil society’.9 As a result, first princi-
ples here can be quite detailed and particular, such as ‘Scripture is the Rule of Faith’ or ‘a
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revelation should be conspicuous’.10 The phrase ‘first principles’ is, at one point, used inter-
changeably with ‘assumptions’.11
As a result, there apparently exist two contending understandings of what first principles are.
The difference seems quite stark. ‘There is an external world’ seems to be completely different
from ‘Scripture is the rule of faith’. Chapter 4’s principles seem to be the product of a natural
endowment that Newman interchangeably calls instinct or intuition; Chapter 9’s seem to be the
result of a judgment, usually unconscious, and perhaps, but not always, proceeding from a
shrewd, seasoned, and developed mind engaged on a specific subject matter, which is why,
among other reasons, this kind of first principle is discussed under the heading of the Illative
Sense, itself a species of virtue.
Newman scholars have offered multiple attempts at explaining, or rather categorizing, these
apparently diverse species of first principles. Jan Walgrave, for example, characterizes first prin-
ciples according to their level of psychological adhesion: ‘There are more peripheral or more
central first principles. There are different layers in the intellectual frame of the mind.’12 The
peripheral or superficial ones can be altered or eliminated with one’s mental and personal devel-
opment, and derive from our personal characteristics or peculiarities and our personal histories.
The core or deepest first principles, by contrast, define one’s personality and are grounded in
our very nature.13
In his study on Newman’s epistemology, Gerard Casey also attempts to account for Newman’s
fluctuating use of the term. According to Casey, Newman’s first principles can be divided up
between ‘absolute’ and ‘relative’ first principles, based on the two different functions he gives to
Natural Inference.14 After extended comparative analysis, Casey concludes that absolute princi-
ples are acquired by intuition; relative by inference. Absolute principles include ‘There are things
external to ourselves’ and ‘There is a right and a wrong.’ On a different plane, relative principles
can be recommended by, or follow from, antecedent assumptions and can be unlearned when they
are false. Among these are, ‘Man is a social being,’ and ‘Man may defend himself.’
To these distinctions, Walter Jost offers us another distinction between what he calls ‘loose’
and ‘strict’ first principles. When Newman uses first principles in the strict sense, he refers to
those first principles that are ‘groundless’ in the sense articulated in The Present Position of
Catholics.15 The ‘looser, more analogical way’ in which Newman uses first principles consists
of referring to antecedent probabilities, prejudices, and contingent conclusions which, though
grounded in previous premises, ‘can be used to constitute and explore a problem’.16
From the above distinctions, parallels begin to emerge. On the one hand, we have Walgrave’s
deep, Casey’s absolute, and Jost’s strict first principles. On the other hand, we have Walgrave’s
peripheral, Casey’s relative, and Jost’s loose first principles. That an external world exists can
be considered a strict, absolute and deep first principle. That miracles are likely to happen is a
loose, relative, and peripheral first principle.17 It is true that, despite such a tidy schematization,
significant disagreements exist among these three authors, and hence their respective categories
cannot correspond completely.18 Nevertheless, we do find concurrence in their depiction of a
variety of kinds of first principles held by Newman, which has led some scholars to attribute the
acquisition of different kinds of first principles to different faculties of mind.
II. ACHTEN ON NEWMAN AND FIRST PRINCIPLES
One such scholar is Rik Achten, whose doctoral dissertation, First Principles and Our Way to
Faith. A Fundamental-Theological Study of John Henry Newman’s Notion of First Principles
(1993) is perhaps the most thorough and recent work dedicated to the topic.
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In addition to an informative and incisive survey of Newman’s writings on the subject,
Achten’s most interesting and fruitful contribution to the topic has been his division of New-
manian first principles into Types I, II, III, and IV. The major division lies between Type I
first principles and the rest. The distinguishing characteristic of Type I first principles is that
they originate in the human being’s nature. They are universal and are acquired by a ‘uni-
versally present instinct’.19 ‘There are things external to us’ and ‘There is a right and a
wrong’ are Type I first principles. The rest (Types II-IV) arise out of culture, history, and
personal circumstances. More specifically, Type II’s are personal principles; Type III’s are
culturally and historically conditioned principles, belonging to a group of persons in a cer-
tain time; and Type IV’s belong to a specific skill, art, or field of knowledge. In short, many
are constituted by the professions, credences, opinions, and presumptions discussed in Ch. 4
on Notional Assent. 20
According to Achten, in the first edition of the Grammar (1870), the Illative sense was
responsible for the acquisition of all of these first principles. But by the 1889 edition, however,
Newman comes to the realization that the noetic faculty (not the Illative sense) is responsible
for Type I’s. This change is manifest in Newman’s 1885 controversy with the Congregationalist
minister and academic, Andrew Martin Fairbairn, who would soon become the first principal of
Mansfield College, Oxford.21
In that controversy, Fairbairn had accused Newman of philosophical scepticism. In response,
Newman touched on the existence of the noetic faculty, or nous:
There is a faculty in the mind which acts as a complement to reasoning, and as having truth
for its direct object thereby secures its use for rightful purposes. This faculty, viewed in its
relation to religion, is, as I have before said, the moral sense; but it has a wider subject-matter
than religion, and a more comprehensive office and scope, as being ‘the apprehension of first
principles,’ and Aristotle has taught me to call it mo~m1 [nous], or the noetic faculty.22
In the above passage, Newman explains in broad terms that the noetic faculty is responsible
for acquiring reasoning’s antecedents, or the material with which reason goes to work.23 Further
down, he reiterates,
in such matters the independent faculty which is mainly necessary for its [reasoning’s]
healthy working and the ultimate warrant of the reasoning act, I have hitherto spoken of as
the moral sense; but, as I have already said, it has a wider subject-matter than religion, and a
larger name than moral sense, as including intuitions, and this is what Aristotle calls mo~m1
[nous].24
Given this appeal to Aristotelian nous, Achten asserts that Newman, only in 1885 with the
Fairbairn controversy, comes to understand ‘clearly’ that ‘we need a special faculty – the nous
or the noetic faculty – for the acquisition of those first principles that form the basis of all rea-
soning. Only then is the noetic faculty clearly distinguished from the Illative sense.’25
From then on, according to Achten, Newman’s account of the acquisition of first principles
changes. Whereas before all four types of first principles were acquired by the Illative sense,
from 1885 onwards Type I first principles are acquired by nous (or the noetic faculty), and
Types II-IV remain beholden, as it were, to the Illative sense. In other words, the Fairbairn con-
troversy marks a turning point in Newman’s epistemic development. The consequence of this
thesis, however, is that Newman’s reflections on prudentia, phronesis, the ‘inductive sense’, and
‘Illative sense’, prior to 1885, would all have to be interpreted in a way that, de facto, rules out
the possibility of their having any interpenetration with nous.
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III. CRITIQUE OF ACHTEN’S POSITION
What is addressed here is not so much Achten’s division of first principles, such as the fact that
some spring forth from nature while others emerge from culture.26 (There are indeed those first
principles which are acquired through a universal instinct, while others are acquired by cultiva-
tion, habit, and circumstance.) Rather, what is at issue here is to what extent the Illative sense is
a ‘separate faculty’ from nous.27 My contention is that distinguishing between the noetic faculty
and the Illative sense is misguided insofar as it imposes an unnecessarily limited understanding
of nous onto Newmanian epistemology, and as a result, empties the Illative sense of its noetic
dimension.28
My argument is essentially that nous is not only responsible for Type I’s but also for Types
II-IV, and if what Achten observes is true – and I think it is – namely, that the Illative Sense is
responsible for acquiring Types II-IV, then it is, by implication, also the case that the Illative
Sense has a noetic dimension, or a function whose object is the truth of propositions (and not
just an assessment of how one proposition inferentially follows from another, whatever their
truth value). What is at stake, then, in Achten’s thesis is nothing less than doing justice to the
multifaceted faculty that is the Illative Sense.
Here, then, I will provide both external and internal evidence that aims to show how the
Fairbairn exchange does not mark a turning point in Newman’s thought. This will, in turn,
show that Aristotelian nous was already in Newman’s mind during his preparations of the
Grammar. The evidence below, then, is offered in order to prepare the reader for an engage-
ment with the Nicomachean Ethics, the aim of which will be to illustrate the noetic dimension
of the Illative Sense.
External Evidence: Newman’s Appeal to Aristotlelian Nous
In this section, I furnish the following evidence of Newman’s awareness of and familiarity with
Aristotelian nous prior to his exchange with Fairbairn. Furthermore, I will show how the Fairbairn
exchange does not manifest any substantial difference from Newman’s prior utilization of nous.
When treating Newman’s Theological Papers on Faith and Certainty, Achten considers
most, but not all, of the chapters. Among the ones Achten neglects is Newman’s lecture on
logic, dated 1859.29 There Newman mentions Aristotelian nous precisely in the context of dif-
ferentiating between two kinds of logic: one in the ‘strict sense’ which is the science of thinking;
the other in the ‘real’ sense, which is the science of knowing, approximating what we might call
epistemology. The former has to do with reason considered as an instrument and examines the
rightness or validity of inferences – logic proper; the latter has to do with knowing and examines
the rightness (or better, the truth) of the premises. This science of knowledge, or truth of the
premises, Newman calls ‘Noology or Gnoseology from Aristotle’s mo~m1 Ethic. lib. 6’.30
Precisely this distinction is the main current running throughout Newman’s response to
Fairbairn: the distinction between ‘reason’ considered as an ‘instrument’ only, or reason consid-
ered in a more broad sense that would be synonymous with the mind. Newman claims to avoid
philosophical scepticism because, taken in the first sense, Newman is glad to complement the
reasoning ‘faculty’ with the noetic ‘faculty’; and taken in the second sense, ‘reason’ acquires
first principles, according to which it then proceeds to ‘reason’.31 Hence, Newman makes the
same distinction in 1885 as he does in 1859.
The other chapter that Achten neglects is Newman’s ‘Papers of 1860 on the Evidence for
Revelation’. There, Newman is describing the various ways of arguing for the truth of Christian-
ity and what suppositions are necessary on the hearer’s part in order for the argument to reso-
nate. Newman writes,
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Since reason in religion, is a reasoning of a religious mind, it is plain that its fundamental axi-
oms will not be intelligible except to religious men. . .Can this be called a science? Aristotle
says an E’pirsglg [Scientific knowledge] is a necessary deduction from principles; and these
principles are natural truths and their habit a natural habit. Yet, in like manner, mo~m1 may be
supernatural – and then this science is not level to the comprehension of any who has not the
supernatural habit.32
In this interesting passage we read about a nous which Newman describes as supernatural.
However, what the principles are that emerge from this supernatural nous is not evident.33
Regardless of what, precisely, this supernatural nous is referring to, what is clear is that
Newman does not hesitate to use this Aristotelian term in a more unfastened way. A look at the
Fairbairn papers here might help: there, Newman seems to use nous in a sense broader than sim-
ply natural intuitions.34 Newman spends quite some time developing the idea that reasoning’s
antecedents are acquired by the noetic faculty. He then begins to explain how right reasoning is
called ‘right’ ‘because its antecedents are chosen rightly by the divinely enlightened mind, being
such as intuitions, dictates of conscience, the inspired Word, the decisions of the Church, and
the like’.35 In other words, the faculty which is responsible for acquiring reasoning’s antece-
dents, i.e., nous, is used in a wide sense as encompassing a variety of sources for first principles.
Some of these surely fall under ‘supernatural nous’.
From the above, we conclude that in 1859-1860 Newman already has a clear idea of the
distinction between (as he would call it in 1885) the antecedents and the consequents in rea-
soning. And in 1859, before the publication of the Grammar, he is already associating these
antecedents – or the materials of the reasoning process – with Aristotelian nous, however
loosely or vaguely. In 1860 he is using nous in a flexible way that encompasses, for exam-
ple, the ‘decisions of the Church’. My contention, then, is that when Newman attributes to
the Illative Sense the role of acquiring all sorts of first principles in the Grammar, there
exists implicitly a noetic dimension to the Illative sense’s acquisition of them all already in
the first edition of 1870.
Internal Evidence: A Closer look at the Grammar of Assent
To support his contention that the Illative Sense does not acquire Type I first principles, and that
this function is, after 1885, attributed to the noetic faculty, Achten appeals to some secondary
literature.36 His appeal to A.J. Boekraad, however, does little to support his case, as Boekraad
merely states that ‘we have no means of determining’ whether the ‘Illative sense or moral sense
and the ‘nous’ of Aristotle are totally equivalent’.37 He also appeals to Ian Ker, who in his notes
claims that ‘Neither the Illative sense nor logic can determine the first principles on which all
knowledge rests.’ Ker goes on to cite some of the Theological Papers and pp. 268-270 of the
Grammar.38 In those pages, however, Newman tells us that that which cannot determine first
principles is (formal) inference or logic. And the Theological Papers are precisely the text under
dispute here.39
In addition to secondary literature, Achten also points to the major alterations in the updated
1889 version of the Grammar that, he claims, corroborate his thesis. He observes that the most
significant portions of omissions and rewrites are in places which discussed first principles. An
examination of these passages, however, fails to truly substantiate the claim that, in the 1889
edition nous now, rather than the Illative sense, is responsible for acquiring first principles.
The first key passage cited by Achten is the first paragraph of the section entitled ‘The Range
of the Illative Sense’. The following passage from the 1870 edition, is omitted from the 1889
edition:
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Since ratiocination, viewed in itself, is an instrumental faculty, though in fact ever embodied
and acting in some definite subject-matter; such also is the Illative Sense, which is its virtue
or perfection. It is only concerned with the soundness of the reasoning; but for the truth of a
conclusion we must have recourse to the truth of the premises. It is a capacity of entering
with instinctive correctness into principles, doctrines, and facts, whether they be true or false,
and of discerning promptly what conclusion from them is necessary, suitable, and expedient,
if they are taken for granted; and this, either by means of a natural gift or from long habitua-
tion to those various circumstances.40
While the deletion of this passage – a passage which seems to imply that the Illative sense is
responsible for ‘entering with instinctive correctness into principles. . .’ – might suggest that
Newman is now denying it, he seems to say something equivalent in the new version:
It is the ratiocinative mind itself. . .however simply in its form and sure in operation, by which
we are able to determine, and thereupon to be certain, that a moving body left to itself will
never stop, and that no man can live without eating. . .It is to the living mind that we must look
for the means of using correctly principles of whatever kind, facts or doctrines, experiences or
testimonies, true or probable, and of discerning what conclusion from these is necessary, suita-
ble, or expedient, when they are taken for granted; and this, either by means of a natural gift,
or from mental formation and practice and long familiarity with those various starting points.41
So while the passage from 1870 in its precise form is omitted from the 1889 edition, the
above passage shows how relevant portions of the previous were reproduced. Is there, for exam-
ple, a significant difference between ‘entering with instinctive correctness into principles etc’.
(1870) and ‘discerning. . .when these [principles etc.] are taken for granted’ (1889)? And even if
it did indicate a difference, surely this later passage would seem to give the Illative Sense an
expanded, not diminished, noetic function.
The lengthiest passage that was taken out in the new edition – some three and a half pages –
was not so much omitted as condensed.42 Newman manages to shorten the original to approxi-
mately two pages. He also sets up a clearer structure, offering the reader some signposts for
what is to follow; such signposts were absent in the 1870 edition. The single most prominent
point in the original is retained in the rewrite, albeit condensed by leaving out examples. The
retained point is that verbal argumentation and analysis are incapable of laying hold of those
‘first elements of thought’ with which reasoning proceeds, and that these ‘first elements’ are
affected by ‘personal characteristics’ that potentially set two individuals at variance with one
another.43 One point omitted in the new edition is Newman’s lengthy paragraph about how the
Illative Sense is employed in one’s approach to facts and personal issues. ‘And thus’, Newman
wrote in 1870, ‘it is the instrument of induction from particulars, and determines what are gen-
eral laws, and what conclusions cannot reach beyond bare probability. . .it is by the Illative
Sense that we reason out, from the data we possess, that nature is uniform. . .’
Two points are of interest here. First, Newman mentions that the Illative Sense induces
general laws from particular phenomena. If the deletion of this claim is meant to show that
Newman no longer holds it, then why is it the case that, in Newman’s 1889 rewrite of the first
omitted passage noted above (Ker 340 (1870 ed. 353) it is the ratiocinative mind that is respon-
sible for ascertaining the truth that ‘a moving body left to itself will never stop’ and ‘no man
can live without eating’? Are these not precisely general laws induced from particular phenom-
ena whose truth is ascertained, not by logical argument, but by the Illative sense? In other
words, the rewrite shows that Newman’s deletion need not – and in fact, did not – indicate a
change in his epistemology.
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Secondly, in the above passage in question, the example Newman gives of a ‘general law’ is
that ‘nature is uniform’. But if this omission were due to a change in Newman’s conception of
the acquisition of first principles, then it would be reasonable to suppose that a corresponding
change in his section on ‘Presumption’ in Ch. 4, which also deals with this principle, would also
have been made. As it is, Newman’s reflections in that section are substantially unchanged: the
uniformity of nature is a general law, ‘derived from experience’ and ‘accepted with . . .a presump-
tion’.44 He has yet, in Ch. 4, to associate the acquisition of this principle of the uniformity of
nature with the Illative Sense, but that can be explained by the fact that he has yet to introduce the
Illative Sense at all in Ch. 4. In sum, the deletion of the passage ‘It [the Illative Sense] is the
instrument of induction from particulars. . .’ need not imply that Newman, in 1889, denies it.45
At this point, then, it should also be noted that the subsection considering the function of the
Illative Sense at the beginning of the inquiry – the most relevant subsection wherein one would
expect significant changes were Achten’s thesis to be correct – is left substantially unchanged
with the exception of one passage, which is omitted ‘Should it be objected. . .etc.’46 In this
lengthy paragraph of about half a page, the only mention of first principles is in a clause in
which Newman aims to defend the utility of the Illative Sense despite the intense disagreement
in historical disputes. ‘It is not the fault of the Illative Sense, that men differ in first principles,’
Newman writes. The principles in question, however, are those which historians deploy in their
interpretation of historical data, such as which points demand proof, and which merit presump-
tion. That Newman deleted the passage regarding the Illative sense’s not being at ‘fault’ for this
disagreement in no way implies that the Illative Sense, rather than the noetic faculty, is solely
responsible for first principles of Types II-IV.
We ought to remember that Newman was already familiar with Aristotelian nous prior to the
first edition of the Grammar. If one seeks an explanation for the omissions in the 1889
Grammar, Newman’s confrontation with this distinction cannot be it. 47
Before we move to the next section, we should note that there is good reason to suppose that a
noetic dimension belongs to the Illative Sense, despite the fact that Newman never uses the word
‘noetic’ in the Grammar (in either edition). When Newman states in the newer edition that the Illa-
tive Sense ‘appeals to no judgment beyond its own, and attends upon the whole course of thought
from antecedents to consequents. . .’,48 he does so without qualification or exception. We should
recall that the language of ‘antecedent’ and ‘consequent’ is precisely that which Newman uses in
his response to Fairbairn when he introduces nous as that faculty which deals with the antecedents
of reasoning. And yet, in the revised edition of the Grammar we have Newman stating that the Illa-
tive Sense deals with both. Nous and the Illative Sense, it seems, must be interconnected in such a
way that certain mental activities that are attributed to the Illative Sense are also noetic.
IV. ARISTOTELIAN NOUS AND NEWMANIAN FIRST PRINCIPLES
For Achten, the noetic faculty’s object is Type I first principles, while Types II-IV are the prov-
ince of the Illative sense whose rootedness in Aristotelian phronesis is well-known. The ques-
tion underlying this section is, Does nous only account for Type I first principles? As Achten
states, Type I’s are ‘spontaneous’ and ‘without intermediary’.49 ‘There is a right and a wrong’ is
an inference (or more accurately, an intuition) stemming from the experience(s) of injustice,
cruelty etc. . .but if nous is what is needed to acquire only such fundamental first principles of
‘universal reception’, why is it necessary, as Newman uses Aristotle to exhort, to:
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attend to the undemonstrable dicta and opinions of the skillful, the old and the Practically
Wise, no less than to those which are based on strict reasoning, because they see aright, hav-
ing gained their power of moral vision from experience.50
It seems that not simply untutored experience, but some version of cultivated, seasoned expe-
rience on a given subject matter, is what helps us acquire the requisite first principles in a given
field, and this acquisition can be attributed to nous.
What I aim to show is not that the Illative Sense is responsible for acquiring Type I principles
(which are acquired by an intuition that Newman would qualify as ‘noetic’, no doubt), but rather
that there can be a properly noetic dimension to those instances where the Illative Sense
acquires first principles of Types II-IV. In other words, the functioning of the Illative Sense at
the beginning of the inquiry is ‘shot through’, as it were, with nous, and therefore the noetic fac-
ulty is not limited to acquiring Type I first principles. In order to show this one need only reflect
on the role that nous plays in its intersection with phronesis in Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics.
For one, the famous section from Aristotle that Newman quotes is in fact located precisely in
the context of discussing the relationship between nous and phronesis.
Nous and Phronesis in Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics
The Nicomachean Ethics is the key Aristotelian text for understanding Newman’s creative
application of Aristotelian thought in the Grammar. In Book VI of the Ethics Aristotle discusses
the intellectual virtues: science (’Epirsglg, episteme), understanding (mo~m1, nous), wisdom
(rouia, sophia), and prudence (uqomgri1, phronesis). For various reasons,51 an almost exclu-
sive attention to understanding (nous) as that which gives us the ‘universal’ and ‘necessary’ first
principles for achieving science has prevailed. In reality, however, nous cannot be reduced to
that which apprehends the definitions of things whereby the universal principles for scientific
demonstration are acquired for, in addition to these scientific syllogisms, Aristotle deploys nous
in practical matters, especially in Book VI, Ch.11 (nous here being rendered as ‘intuitive
reason’):
For not only must the man of practical wisdom know particular facts, but understanding and
judgement are also concerned with things to be done, and these are ultimates. And intuitive
reason [nous] is concerned with the ultimates in both directions; for both the first terms and
the last are objects of intuitive reason [nous] and not of argument, and the intuitive reason
[nous] which is presupposed by demonstrations grasps the unchangeable and first terms, while
the intuitive reason [nous] involved in practical reasonings grasps the last and variable fact,
i.e., the minor premiss. For these variable facts are the starting-points for the apprehension of
the end, since the universals are reached from the particulars; of these therefore we must
have perception, and this perception is intuitive reason [nous].52
From this passage it becomes clear that, in the Nicomachean Ethics nous has a practical as
well as a scientific function. Nous acquires the particulars of what has been called a ‘practical
syllogism’. Accordingly, the major premise is a rule or principle (arche) e.g., ‘That which is
pleasant is to be done’; the minor is the particular case hic et nunc as an instance of the major
principle, e.g., ‘This is pleasant.’ For Aristotle, it is nous – rendered ‘intuitive reason’ by Ross,
and ‘Intuition’ by Chase – which apprehends this singular. Nous, as a result, takes on two roles:
apprehending necessary universals and apprehending particular singulars by perception
(ai’rhgri1).
This perception is a ‘seeing’, but in a figurative way. The point is that when the sensible
person – or ‘prudent man’ – the one who is judicious, who possesses common sense, sees a
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principle active in a given particular, he ‘perceives’ it, and he does so immediately and intui-
tively;53 he has nous, ‘good sense’, or ‘understanding’. It is important to recognize here that
nous is now applied, not to speculative demonstrations about necessary things, but to ‘those
[things] in respect of which a man might doubt and deliberate’54; this is, in short, the concrete
realm in which Newman is so interested.
Clarifying Practical Nous
The single most distinctive mark of an ‘intuition’ for Newman, is that it is immediate – not that
it is universal and irresistible.55 This is also precisely the mark attributed to nous by scholars of
Aristotle.56 While universality and irresistibility are marks of Type I first principles, in his
papers entitled ‘Assent and Inference’ Newman claims that intuitions can be conditioned by
age, sex, and talent, and that this conditioning affects the extent to which certain intuitions are
received.57 In other words, Newman seems to be implying that Types II-IV first principles are
also intuited. Far from reserving intuition to Type I’s, Newman writes:
Intuition, though it is the absolute assent which we are naturally capable of giving to the first
principles of all knowledge, may be exercised on other truths; it is the gift of the few as well
as of the multitude. It is the exercise of a faculty, which is stronger or weaker in this man or
that, but of which in every state truth is the object.58
Attention should be drawn here not only to the extension of intuitions beyond Type I first
principles, but also to the explicit demarcation of its object: namely, truth. In other words, these
intuitions are responsible for ascertaining the truths of reasoning’s antecedents, precisely the
role given to nous by Newman in his response to Fairbairn.
In Newman’s response to Fairbairn, it should be mentioned that Newman is consulting D.P.
Chase’s translation of Aristotle, the footnotes of which can be helpful in illuminating Newman’s
thought.59 Having summarized the functioning of nous in the practical realm, we are better posi-
tioned to understand Chase’s footnote when he writes,
There are cases where we must simply accept or reject without proof: either when Principles
are propounded which are prior to all reasoning, or when particular facts are brought before
us which are simply matters of aisthesis. Aristotle here brings both these cases within the
province of nous, i.e. he calls by this name the Faculty which attains Truth in each.60
Chase again:
There are cases both of principles and facts which cannot admit of reasoning, and must be
authoritatively determined by nous. What makes nous to be a true guide? only practice, i.e.
Experience.61
In relation to first principles it is essential to recognize that ‘there are first principles in practi-
cal reason’62 and that these first principles – far from being universal, necessary, and irresistible
– are acquired by practice, by experience; and yet, they are nevertheless recognized by nous.
Nous, in addition to deliberation (embotkia), judiciousness (rmmeri1), and exhibiting equi-
tableness (cmxlg), is considered in its practical form a subsidiary of phronesis. By this, I mean
that all of these are considered to be functions of phronesis, and that all of these are attributed to
one who is denoted as ‘practically wise’.63
Crucial here, I would suggest, is the reliance of these other phronetic functions on nous. Judi-
ciousness, for example, which amounts to judging well of what someone else says about matters
concerning practical wisdom,64 is impossible without apprehending the particulars in question.
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In other words, this practical nous is a critical component of what it means to be uqomilo1, or a
prudent person.
The Noetic Dimension of the Illative Sense in Acquiring Principles of Types II-IV
Despite Newman’s descriptions of the Illative Sense as the power of ‘judging and concluding,
when in its perfection’,65 it would be wrong to reduce the Illative Sense to that which assesses
the legitimacy of various inferences. For the capacity to judge of a concrete question already
supposes that action of the mind which, according to Newman, ‘detects’, ‘illustrates’, ‘estab-
lishes’, and ‘eliminates’ ‘those first elements of thought’ which are ‘half the battle in the infer-
ence’.66 Without a noetic dimension attributed to the Illative Sense, it makes little sense for
Newman to declare that this virtue ‘has its function in the beginning, middle, and end’ of all
inquiry.67
Admittedly, it is not at all obvious that Aristotle’s examples of the functioning of practical
nous are particularly enlightening for understanding Newman. One such example is: ‘All water
that weighs heavy is bad’ and ‘This particular water weighs heavy’.68 Newman’s first principles
of religious apologetic are prima facie very different. What is seminal in Aristotelian practical
syllogisms, however, is that the exercise of nous enables one to either acquire or to be better
able to accept the first principles of which the particulars perceived are an instantiation. In the
words of Chase, ‘By habitually acting on the Minor Premiss. . .a man comes really to hold the
Major Premiss.’69 What is more, these particulars might not exist within the domain of a ‘uni-
versal instinct’, but within the domain of particular experiences and expertise.
Now it would be a stretch of the imagination to suggest that Newman is repeating Aristotle’s
exhortation to attend to the skillful, old, and wise in order to substantiate one’s own conviction
about the existence of an external world or about there being a right and a wrong. What is at
issue here are, in fact, precisely the more delicate and controversial first principles, or Achten’s
Types II-IV. Society’s seasoned individuals are those who have nous or understanding, or good
sense in a particular subject matter, and we consult them, not on the obvious, but on the right
course of action (or inference) in that particular field; for Newman we go to them also for the
sake of the principles which they have acquired and have, over many years, thought to be
dependable. Newman’s echo of Aristotle makes most sense if we posit a noetic dimension to the
Illative Sense when it functions at the beginning of an inquiry.
If one accepts Newman’s transference of phronesis from the realm of praxis to the realm
of verity (i.e., from questions of ‘what is to be done’ to ‘what is (was) the case?’), then
should not the practical functioning of nous also undergo this creative transference? And if
we bear in mind one of Newman’s favorite adages, we are obliged to seek out the one who
has expertise in that which we are seeking to know more about: ‘Cuique in arte sua^ creden-
dum est’.70 In other words, if we seek to know more about religion, for example, we ought
to go to those who have experiences of it.
What is at issue is not simply apprehending a particular, such as experiencing the drinking of
water as invigorating and then habituating oneself into affirming that water gives energy. As
social beings, humans are given to experiencing not only things, but also the assessments and
evaluations which their surrounding culture attaches to them, thereby confirming or reinforcing
individuals’ preliminary convictions. Experiential or cultivated nous, then, not only touches
what we make of an external world, but also what we make of gossip, testimony, hearsay,
adages, and the like, which, in turn, might bear on highly existential and religious questions.
Examples of these might include, ‘a revelation is possible’, ‘testimonies of an extraordinary
religious experience ought to be taken seriously’, ‘miracles happen’, ‘God’s ways are not our
ways’, and even ‘A God who wants to be known will provide the requisite means.’ Such
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propositions are not so much argued for as they are assented to by way of an intuition, even if
that intuition is far from irresistible or universally adhered to. They are not necessarily the fruits
of a series of inferences, but of ‘insights’ or ‘intuitions’ of someone in touch with his or her con-
science. They are not arbitrary assumptions with which we start an inquiry; rather, they can be
conceived of as implicit assumptions which are based on past experiences and which have pro-
ven to be effective interpretive guides in dealing with a certain subject matter. And these are
legitimately attributed to nous.
V. CONCLUSION
Newman neither uses the word ‘noetic’ in the Grammar, nor does he explicitly divide up his
first principles into the way in which Achten does. Hence, from the outset it is difficult to assess
Achten’s thesis.
We saw that Newman was already familiar with the noetic faculty and that the alterations
between the two editions of the Grammar did not corroborate the claim that Newman’s position
changed. In highlighting the function of practical nous in the Nicomachean Ethics, I showed
that a nous which can be cultivated, which is rooted in experience, and which is deployed in the
practical sphere, is materially equivalent to the functioning of the Illative Sense when it deals
with more complex assumptions beyond the obvious Type I principles. In short, the Illative
Sense has, I contend, a noetic dimension, and hence, reserving the ‘noetic faculty’ to the acquisi-
tion of Type I first principles unnecessarily compartmentalizes the kind of mental activity in
question: namely, ascertaining the truth of reasoning’s antecedents.
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